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■ An interest rate cap policy has been newly introduced to the Cambodian microfinance sector since April 2017.  
■ This policy note summarizes the results of a survey, carried out jointly by JICA, CMA and CBC, that investigates the 
impact of the Cambodian interest rate cap policy.  
■ Based on the results of the survey, it can be seen that the outreach of MFIs (Microfinance Institutions) declined due 
to the implementation of this policy. Specifically, MFIs reduced the availability of costly or high-risk profile loans, 
such as non-collateral and small-sized loans, which are more likely to be extended to lower-income households. 
■ However, the impact is different from MFI to MFI, depending on each one’s original customer segments and operation. 
Especially large differences were found between deposit-taking MFIs and non-deposit-taking MFIs.  
■ To mitigate the negative side effect of the policy, we suggest that the government and the development agencies 
should consider taking actions such as implementing supporting measures for financial inclusion, addressing 
regulatory arbitrage, and enhancing the transparency of the microfinance sector. 
                                                          
* This policy note is written by Daiju Aiba (Research Fellow, JICA Ogata Research Institute), Sovannroeun Samreth (Associate 
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1．Introduction 
In April 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC), 
the central bank of Cambodia, implemented an 
interest rate cap policy in the microfinance sector. 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Cambodia are 
regulated and supervised by the NBC, and this policy 
has restricted interest rates on lending of all the MFIs 
to no more than 18% on an annual basis (monthly at 
1.5%).1 
International experience shows that interest 
rate cap policies tend to cause a decline in the 
number of borrowers, and a reduction of 
transparency in lending (Alper 2018; Madeira 2019; 
Ferrari et al. 2018). In the case of Cambodia, the 
interest rate cap policy was exclusively implemented 
for MFIs, whose operations are generally oriented 
towards extending outreach to the poor and are not 
necessarily for profit. Thus, there is a concern that 
this interest rate cap policy could curb MFI lending 
to the poor.  
To examine the real impact of interest rate 
cap policy, the Cambodia Microfinance Association 
(CMA), the Cambodia Credit Bureau (CBC), and 
JICA Ogata Research Institute (JICA-Ogata-RI) 
carried out a joint survey of the lending behavior of 
MFIs and borrower behavior in Cambodia. 
Specifically, data on loan disbursements by all the 
financial institutions in Cambodia are collected 
through the CBC database, which recorded about 
7,000,000 loan disbursements between January 2016 
The Background to the Interest Rate Cap Policy in Cambodia 
The Cambodian banking sector is regulated by the NBC. The Cambodian banking sector was composed of five types of 
financial institutions as of 2017: 39 commercial banks, 15 specialized banks, 76 MFIs, 313 rural credit institutions, and 11 
financial leasing companies. The MFIs are further divided into 7 deposit-taking microfinance institutions (MDIs), and 
69 non-deposit-taking microfinance institutions (Non-MDIs). Regulations on MDIs and non-MDIs, such as minimum 
capital requirements, solvency ratios, and liquidity ratios, are different. The minimum capital requirement is USD30 
million for MDIs, and 1.5 million USD for non-MDIs.   
An interest rate cap policy was announced on March 3rd 2017 and has been implemented since April 1st, 2017 
(NBC 2018). According to NBC (2017, 2018), the regulation requires MDIs, non-MDIs, and rural credit institutions 
under the NBC’s supervision to set the interest rate on loans so this does not exceed 18% per year for any maturity. This 
interest rate ceiling is applied to new credit contracts as well as restructured loans and refinancing from April 1st, 2017. 
The interest rate cap policy was initially aimed to improve market efficiency by dumping inefficient MFIs from the 
market (IMF 2017). As of 2019, no MFIs have withdrawn from the market due to the interest rate cap, but several MDIs 
and non-MDIs have been acquired or merged with other financial institutions and/or non-financial institutions.  
The government may also have expected that the introduction of an interest rate cap policy would reduce the 
debt burden of households. In fact, there were concerns of over-indebtedness from predatory lending in the MFI sector. 
The average amount of loans has been increasing rapidly, while the increases in SME loans and mortgage loans have 
contributed to increasing loan sizes. Thus, although the interest rate cap can reduce the debt burden for such 
households, the cap is too low for MFIs to keep lending to the poor. Before the interest rate cap policy was implemented, 
estimated average interest rates were more than 20% but MFIs that lend to rural households had set average interest 




p. 3  JICA Ogata Research Institute Policy Note No.8 July 2021                     JICA Ogata Research Institute 
and March 2019. For borrower behavior, face-to-face 
interviews were carried out with 1,000 households in 
4 provinces of Cambodia. The CMA-CBC-JICA 
survey is the first to provide comprehensive data on 
MFI lending and borrower behavior regarding the 
impact of interest rate caps. In this policy note we 
summarize the results and contributions of the 
research based on this survey and provide policy 
recommendations. 
 
2．Objectives and Results of the Joint 
Survey by CMA, CBC and JICA 
 
In Cambodia, implementation of an interest rate cap 
could cause inefficiency and reduction in outreach in 
a lending market. The Cambodian MFIs are all 
registered with the NBC and there are regulations 
regarding capital requirements, the maximum size of 
single loan provision, and liquidity ratios. However, 
entry barriers seem to be small. In fact, the number of 
MFIs increased from 19 in 2008 to 76 in 2017. This 
high intensity of competitiveness in the Cambodian 
microfinance sector could drive MFIs to reduce loans 
to the poor in response to the introduction of an 
interest rate cap (McIntosh and Wydick 2005).  
To address this issue, the CMA, the CBC, and 
JICA-Ogata-RI carried out a joint survey to attempt 
to advance the debate on interest rate cap policies 
and examine the effects of the newly introduced 
interest rate cap on the lending behavior of MFIs and 
borrower behavior in Cambodia. To understand the 
impact on the demand side and on the supply side, 
the main data were collected from two different 
sources in the joint survey. The first dataset was 
information on loan disbursements granted by all the 
registered financial institutions in Cambodia, and 
the data is provided by the CBC. The other is 
information from 1000 Cambodian households who 
were interviewed in August-September 2019. The 
following section gives a summary of the results of 
the analysis. 
 
(2-1) Impact on lending behavior by financial 
institutions 
 
Regarding MFI behavior, Aiba et al. (2020) examined 
the impacts on the lending of non-MDIs and MDIs 
using loan-account-level data of loan disbursements 
obtained from the CBC’s credit registry data. The 
data contains information of about 7,000,000 newly 
disbursed loan accounts from 2016M1 to 2019M3. 
The detailed data allows us to investigate the impact 
of policy implementation by exposing variations 
across loan types, across financial institutions, and 
across regions. This analysis revealed that the size of 
each loan disbursement significantly changed after 
the interest rate cap policy was implemented. 
Especially, the disbursement of loans of less than 500 
USD decreased (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Loan Disbursements by Loan Sizes (MDIs) 
Source: Aiba et al. (2020). 
 
 
In addition, the interest rate cap policy affected the 
outreach of MDIs and non-MDIs. The data show that 
the interest rate cap policy has had a negative impact 
on the number of loan disbursements relating to non-
collateral loans, local currency, group-lending loans, 
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and agricultural loans.2 We found that MDIs 
decreased or at least did not increase loan provision 
in both rural and urban areas. In the meantime, non-
MDIs started increasing their loan disbursements in 
urban areas and decreasing them in rural areas. Thus, 
the entire impact on the lending of non-MDIs is 
unclear, but the outreach of non-MDIs was 
negatively affected by the interest rate cap policy.  
This decline in new disbursements of costly 
loans might have some consequences for gender 
financial inclusion. Female-related loans tend to be 
non-collateral, in a group lending scheme, for 
agricultural purposes, and/or are small, all of which 
are cost factors in MFI lending and are also impacted 
by changes in interest rate cap policy. Thus, even 
though MDIs and non-MDIs did not intend to 
decrease loan provision just for the reason that 
borrowers were female, the loans for female 
borrowers could be affected by the interest rate cap 
policy. However, Aiba et al. (2020) further found 
that the number of borrowers of female-related loans 
did not necessarily decrease after the interest rate 
cap policy change. This implies that MDIs and non-
MDIs struggled to keep female borrowers by 
increasing the number of borrowers per loan 
disbursement, even while they reduced loan 
disbursements.  
Aiba et al. (2020) further document empirical 
evidence that the lending rates of commercial banks 
also decreased on average after the interest rate cap 
policy was implemented. The decline in commercial 
bank lending rates was possibly caused by the strong 
competition between MFIs and commercial banks. 
Since some customer segments of each of them 
overlap commercial banks might face pressure to 
decrease interest rates to keep their customers in 
response to the decrease in interest rates of non-
MDIs and MDIs. However, this analysis is still 
descriptive and exploratory. Further investigation 
into causality is needed. 
 
(2-2) Impacts on household behavior 
 
In analysing the borrower side, Samreth et al. (2020) 
investigated the impacts of an interest rate cap based 
on the data from a survey conducted between August 
19, 2019 and September 20, 2019 in Cambodia. 
Specifically, Samreth et al. (2020) examined the 
impact of the interest rate cap on credit or borrowing 
costs (i.e., interest rates and loan assessment and 
processing fees), loan size and loan maturity. 
Moreover, the effects of the cap imposition on 
informal credit and household debt service burden 
were also discussed and analyzed.  
Samreth et al. (2020) found that, while the 
imposition of the cap reduced interest rate credit 
costs, leading to a decrease in credit costs for 
borrowers, the benefit from this reduction may be 
partially offset by increases in loan assessment and 
processing fees. However, the offset effect seems to 
be small. For loan size and loan maturity, evidence on 
the increase of the average loan size exists, but the 
difference in loan maturity before and after the cap is 
not statistically significant. Samreth et al. (2020) 
also indicate that the percentage of loans from 
informal sources seems to have increased by a few 
percentage points.  
From the analysis of factors affecting the 
household debt service burden, Samreth et al. (2020) 
indicate that a higher debt service burden is 
associated with larger loan size. Since an increase in 
the loan size at relatively small loan level is observed 
after the cap, the positive relationship between loan 
size and debt service burden may imply the increase 
of the debt service burden among relatively small 
borrowers. Furthermore, it is also evident that 
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households’ debt service burden is negatively 
associated with their financial literacy, implying that 
there is an important role for financial literacy in 
alleviating the debt service burden among borrowers. 
 
3. Policy Recommendations 
 
The CMA-CBC-JICA survey is the first survey to 
provide a quantitative analysis using comprehensive 
large-scale data from various data sources. Therefore, 
we believe the insights and policy implications based 
on evidence from the survey are useful from the 
policy-making perspective. Based on the 
documented evidence, we draw several policy 
recommendations as follows. 
 
(3-1) To reduce the negative side-effects, taking 
complementary/supportive measures or 
adjusting the interest rates cap on regular basis 
is needed. 
There is no one-size-fit-all policy measure. Setting 
the interest rates cap at the same level for all loans 
and all MFIs could lead to reductions in the variation 
of MFI services for poor households, since a lot of 
different types of borrowers exist, and there could be 
a large variety in the financial products available. 
In the analysis of the MFIs (Aiba et al. 2020), 
it was found that interest rate policy changes had an 
impact on the number of loan disbursements and the 
average loan size. In particular, the analysis revealed 
that MFIs reduced disbursements of costly (or risky) 
loans, such as non-collateral loans and group-lending 
loans, after policy implementation.  
Furthermore, as is shown by Aiba et al. 
(2020), there are large variations in loan products 
across MFIs. These findings suggest that interest rate 
cap policy leads to a reduction in loans to poor 
households, since the loan provisions for those 
households are typically costly in terms of both risks 
and physical costs. This means that MFIs with more 
poor clients are especially affected by the policy.  
For facilitating the outreach of MFIs under a 
low interest rate environment, it is required that 
governments take complementary measures or 
adjust the existing interest rates cap. The interest 
rate cap policy per se could be effective in reducing 
the debt burden of borrowers and ensuring MFIs 
reduce costs. However, there could be negative side 
effects. Thus, taking measures to support MFIs so 
that they are able to keep providing loans to the poor 
or making frequent adjustment of regulations based 
on evidence is required to mitigate such negative 
effects of policy. 
The ideal practice of interest rate cap policy 
is designed not to reduce the outreach of MFIs by 
designing the policy differently from MFI to MFI 
based on what sectors they mainly lend to. However, 
there are also limitations of the capacity of 
supervisors of MFIs, in terms both of research and 
enforcement. Thus, it is difficult to collect enough 
comprehensive information about the MFI 
managements, and set the appropriate interest rates 
for each MFI. Another practical way to deal with the 
negative side-effect could be to simply set the unique 
interest rate cap, while reviewing the level of interest 
rate cap regularly based on the MFI’s costs and 
macroeconomic situations (inflation rates, exchange 
rate, and so on). The supervisor needs to collect or to 
facilitate the transparency of the operating costs and 
credit costs of MFIs, to objectively assess the level of 
the interest rate cap. 
 
 (3-2) Setting caps at moderate level could work 
well in reducing predatory lending activities. 
Samreth et al. (2020) show that the average interest 
rates set by MFIs are around 1.8 percent monthly. 
However, the current interest rate cap is set at 1.5 
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percent monthly. This means that current interest 
rates are lower than the market rates for MFI lending.  
The international experience of interest rate 
cap policies suggests that setting interest rates at a 
high level has no significant impact on the pattern of 
lending, although it seems to be effective in 
preventing extreme pricing. Thus, if governments 
aim to prevent predatory lending by MFIs from the 
consumer protection perspective, caps could be set 
at a higher level to prevent the charging of 
excessively high interest rates by financial 
institutions to less literate borrowers. However, 
interest rate cap policy is still a blunt instrument 
when used to regulate financial institutions. If there 
is a need for measures to protect consumers, 
developing the legal framework on usury and 
enhancing the monitoring of financial institutions 
are also potential strategies.    
 
(3-3) The regulations should be redesigned given 
the increasing competition between banks and 
MFIs, including in the labor market. 
Aside from competition within MFIs, there is also a 
concern about the current market competition 
between MFIs and commercial banks, which has 
become more intense in recent years. For 
sustainability, MFIs need to keep a certain level of 
profits, otherwise they cannot keep lending to risky 
and costly borrowers, as this leads to mission drift. 
The intense competition could drive MFIs to shift 
loans away from segments of their poorer clients due 
to a reduction in their market power. Designing 
preferential regulatory frameworks for MFIs is one of 
the possible policy strategies to mitigate excessive 
competition between commercial banks and MFIs. 
Further, the market competition between 
MFIs and commercial banks is even intense in the 
labor market for loan officers. This rising 
competition in the labor market could impact on the 
operational costs of MFIs and put pressure on 
interest rates. Because MFI lending is labor intensive, 
the quality and experiences of loan officers are 
important to the extension of loans to households in 
rural areas. As Aiba et al. (2020) show, operational 
costs are a significant cost factor and a reason for 
high interest rates in MFI lending, and labor expense 
is typically a main component of financial institution 
costs. Thus, the recent rise in competition between 
MFIs and commercial banks makes MFIs face 
increases in operational costs to keep quality loan 
officers employed. Fintech could alter part of the 
function of loan officers. However, hard information 
(quantitative data, such as financial statements) is 
not enough to ensure the effective screening of 
borrowers for micro loans, and soft information 
(information which is not easy to quantify) is 
difficult to evaluate qualitatively without skilled 
loan officers.3 
Market structures should be considered 
when implementing regulations on financial 
institutions. Even though an interest rate cap policy 
could reduce the market power of financial 
institutions, this policy could lead to an oligopolistic 
market structure, and this could in turn lead to more 
market power with a small number of MFIs. The 
regulators should consider the relationship between 
market structure and outreach. Although it should 
be determined which market structure is optimal for 
the sustainability and outreach of MFIs, the lack of 
research on competition and MFI behavior is also a 
problem.  
 
(3-4) Regulatory arrangement is needed to 
reduce regulatory arbitrage of interest rate cap 
policy.  
The analysis of household behavior (Samreth et al. 
2020) revealed that access to informal finance 
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increased after the interest rate cap policy. Aiba et al. 
(2020) also found that disbursement of short-term 
loans decreased in comparison to that of long-term 
loans, and emergency loans (social loans) also 
decreased after the interest rate cap policy was 
introduced. Heng et al. (2021) report that loans 
provided by pawnshops increased from 38 million 
USD in 2016 to 158 million USD in 2020.  
This suggests that households have lost 
opportunities to access short-term formal credit for 
emergency purposes, and there could be an 
increasing need for households to have access to 
informal finance, such as pawnshops or loan sharks 
in the case that negative shocks happen to household 
incomes. However, the pawnshops are supervised by 
the Ministry of Economic and Finance while they 
work to provide credit to MFIs’ clients by exploiting 
regulatory arbitrage. This can cause loopholes in the 
supervision of credit markets, leading to unfair 
environments, and weaken consumer protection. 
Thus, more strict monitoring of informal finance is 
needed, and the interest rate cap policy increased the 
administrative costs of the regulator in this regard.  
In addition, there is the problem of increasing 
the market power of informal lenders. Households 
are required to borrow at higher interest rates when 
they need credit from informal lenders. In addition, 
exploiting behavior by informal lenders will become 
more intense during economic crises. But informal 
finance per se is not an enemy and could promote 
better asset reallocation in the economy. However, if 
people need short-term liquidity for emergency 
purposes they tend to reduce their assets at fire sale 
prices. In the period of economic crisis, this negative 
aspect of informal finance will outperform the 
positive aspects. The current economic downturn 
caused by COVID-19 could also have the same effect. 
Thus, governments should pay attention to informal 
finance, and the policy measures to help people out 
before they need to access informal finance. 
 
(3-5) Financial literacy needs to be fostered to 
mitigate the negative side effects of interest rate 
cap policy.  
Interest rate cap policy causes some unintentional 
side effects on borrowers, aside from reductions in 
credit access. First, there is a significant increase in 
loan size per borrower. Even though the interest rate 
on borrowers is lowered, the amount of outstanding 
loans becomes large and offsets the reduction in 
interest rate in terms of the debt burden for 
borrowers. Second, the debt burden on borrowers 
could be worse than before. The survey of households 
revealed that many borrowers could not answer 
questions about monthly interest rates, possibly 
because of low financial literacy. Increases in 
commission fees might also lessen borrower’s 
awareness of their interest burdens, since they make 
the calculation of effective interest rates more 
complicated.   
These side effects could be worsened by the 
low financial literacy of borrowers. In fact, as 
Samreth et al. (2020) show, borrower awareness of 
actual interest rates is relatively low both for non-
current borrowers and even for current borrowers. 
Increases in loan size (debt burden) and commission 
fee (interest burden) could therefore result in high 
delinquency on loan repayments, particularly for 
low-financially-literate households. Thus, even 
though interest rate cap policy could be beneficial for 
borrowers by decreasing loan repayments, 
households might not notice this as an advantage. 
Theoretically, some borrowers that were originally 
discouraged from access to credit would start 
accessing MFIs due to the decrease in interest rates. 
However, according to the survey results, the news 
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about interest rate cap policy is not widely spread 
among households. Even though borrowers have 
opportunities to access better credit, many of them 
were not aware of this fact. Improving borrower 
awareness and literacy about finance could be a 
possible solution. 
Loan officers could be the sources of financial 
knowledges for borrowers. Thus, educating loan 
officers (in terms both of financial knowledge and 
ethics) to spread financial knowledge to borrowers 
is also recommended to improve household financial 
literacy and awareness.  
 
(3-6) Improvement of the transparency in MFI 
lending practices is needed. The CMA should 
enhance monitoring and self-regulation of MFI 
lending by collecting more data. 
Regular close monitoring of MFI lending by the 
CMA is required. Some MFIs are shifting toward 
lending to microenterprises and SMEs towards 
larger amounts at lower interest rates. However, this 
could also reduce the variety of financial products 
and the customer segments of MFIs. Some policy 
arrangement or self-regulation is required to keep the 
loan provision to the poor.     
As the analysis on MFI loans suggests that 
fixed cost per borrower is significant, MFIs will 
possibly change lending technology toward less 
costly, i.e. less labor-intensive ones, such as credit 
scoring. However, there is concern that such 
technologies are dependent on hard information, 
such as legal documents and financial statements, 
and this could drive MFIs away from their poor 
customers. The CMA should monitor changes in 
MFI lending to prevent mission drift behavior. 
International lenders are also important 
stakeholders in the Cambodian MFI sector. They are 
the main funding sources for MFIs in the sense that 
their funds are set at low interest rates and are large. 
However, the disclosure of information on MFIs’ 
activities is not comprehensive in Cambodia. Thus, 
transparency is still low in Cambodian MFIs. In fact, 
while some MFIs have increased loan size per 
borrower in recent years, MFI lending practice is 
unclear. For example, how are such loans secured or 
left unsecured, and how are they extended to SMEs 
and females? The CMA (or regulators) should collect 
and disclose more information to international 
lenders to make sure where loans are needed and 
whether there is need of funding from these lenders. 
 
(3-7) It is needed to re-define and make 
standards for microfinance business, and to 
disclose information on the provision of micro 
loans as a commitment to outreach and poverty 
reduction. 
There is a huge variation in the patterns of loan 
composition in terms of products, areas, and loan 
sizes across MFIs. Some MFIs extend loans mainly to 
rural areas, but others only extend to urban areas. 
This suggests that the objectives and business 
models of MFIs are widely different from institution 
to institution. Aiba and Okuda (2020) evaluate MFIs 
in terms of the extent of outreach-orientation and 
efficiency in operation, and the capital/labor 
intensiveness of Cambodian and Philippines MFIs. 
Their results show that the objectives and business 
models of MFIs vary across countries, and within 
countries. Furthermore, Vanroose and D’Espallier 
(2013) show that the development of the 
microfinance sector can be explained by the level of 
development of the traditional banking sector 
(commercial banks). In this regard, Aiba and Okuda 
(2019) provide similar findings that show that the 
development of the Cambodian microfinance sector 
can be explained partly by the low development of 
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the commercial banking sector. 
It is pointed out that competition in MFIs has 
become high recently due to a large number of entries 
of new MFIs, and there is a rising competition 
between MFIs and commercial banks. In this 
environment, there is a concern about the mission 
drift of MFIs. However, the uniform regulation of all 
MFIs is not desirable since they have different 
objectives and business strategies in their operation. 
In the meantime, the information disclosures of MFIs 
are not enough to clarify the objectives of each MFI. 
Thus, enhancing transparency through disclosing 
information, such as the types of borrowers MFIs 
lend to, is helpful for policy-makers and microfinance 
investment vehicles when they try to figure out 
which institutions still need support for poverty 
reduction.  
To facilitate proper disclosure and enhancing 
transparency in the microfinance sector, one possible 
strategy is to make an official standard or to set an 
official goal for microfinance lending. The CMA 
could then take the role of establishing standards or 
goals and evaluating whether each MFI meets those 
standards and goals. Such a process would facilitate 
data submission by MFIs if they are willing to be 
evaluated as lending to the poor. This strategy will 
make the MFI business transparent for policy 
makers and international investors,4  and enable 






1 In Cambodia, microfinance institutions are categorized into two legal entities: deposit-taking microfinance 
institutions, and non-deposit taking microfinance institutions. The former are known as MDIs legally, and the latter 
are called MFIs in official documents of the NBC. However, throughout this paper, we categorize non-deposit 
taking microfinance as “Non-MDIs” to avoid confusion, and we label MDIs and Non-MDIs collectively as MFIs 
. 
2 There is a caveat in interpreting their results as causality. Aiba et al. (2020) found that the reduction in the number 
of borrowers is correlated to local currency, non-collateral loans, group-lending loans and small-sized loans. 
However, the correlation does not necessarily represent the causality, and there is still the possibility that other 
changes in regulation or macroeconomic conditions will affect the reduction relating to these loan characteristics.   
 
3 According to Liberti and Petersen (2019), hard information is almost always recorded as numbers, such as 
financial statements, stock returns, and payment histories. Soft information is often communicated as text, such as 
opinions, rumors, ideas, statement of management future plans, and market commentaries. 
 
4 In recent years, private investors have expanded to have substantial shares in capital inflows for MFIs around the 
world. Apart from public lenders, attracting such private investors is also needed for sustainable microfinance 
lending. 
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